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RIGHTS OF THE STATES IN THEIR NATURAL RESOURCES
PARTICULARLY AS APPLIED TO WATER
DuDL'EY WARRF.N WoooBRIDG~*
SouRC'E oF R.IGH'l'S oli' S'l'A'l''Es

The origin of the rights of the states to their natural resources is
nowhere better stated than by Mr. Justice Stone in the case of Com11tat~wealth of Massachusetts v. State of New York: 1
"The English possessions in America were claimed by right
of discovery. The rights of property and dominion in the lands
discovered by those acting under royal authority were held to
vest in the crown, which under the principles of the British
Constitution was deemed to hold them as a part of the public
domain for the benefit of the nation.... As a. result of the Revolution the people of each state became sovereign, and in that
capacity acquired the rights of the crown in the public domain ..."
The same principle was applied with respect to new states formed
out of the territory of the original thirteen states.!~ However, title
to lands ceded to or purchased by the United States is vested in the
United States subject to treaty provisions and subsequent grants.
The state is also the owner of all things ferae naturae. And in the
well known case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.3 in which the
State of Georgia sought to enjoin defendant Copper Companies from
discharging noxious gases from their works in Tennessee over the
lands in Georgia to the great injury thereof the Supreme Court of
the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, said:
"This is a. suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity
of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
earth and air within its domain."
~(:b;;;ilor, Professor of Jurisprudence and Dean, Department of Jurisprudence, Col!ege
of William and Mary.

1. 271 u. s. 65, 79 (1925).
2. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (U. S. 1844).
3. 206 u. s. 230, 237 (1906).
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OwNERSHIP oF TmELA~'"DS

In a series of cases culminating in U11ited States v. State of Louisiana,4 the Supreme Court of the United States has held that no state
has any title to the natural resources under tidal waters. (No, not
even Texas.) 5 The Court speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas
stated:
"The claim to our three mile belt was first asserted by the
national government. Protection and control of the area are indeed functions of national external sovereignty. The marginal
sea is a national, not a state concern. National interests, national responsibilities, national concerns are involved. The problems of commerce, national defense, relations with other powers,
war and peace focus there. National rights must therefore be
paramount in that area."6
OwNERSHIP OF CLOl:JDS

There has been much speculation as to who owns the clouds. Until
recent years this speculation has been almost entirely academic, but
since the advent of aviation and artificially induced rainfall the question has already become of practical importance and will undoubtedly
increase in importance as time moves on. The private owner of the
surface has some rights, at least as far up as is needed by him for
the quiet enjoyment of the surface and structures on the surface.
In fact The Uniform Aeronautics Act even states :7
"The ownership of the space above the lands and waters of
this State is declared to be vested in the several owners of the
surface beneath, subject to the right of flight described in Section 4."
While this Act has been withdrawnS from the active list of recommended uniform acts by the Commission on Uniform State Laws
it has been adopted by some twenty-one states.
As clouds are ferae 11aturae, fugitive in nature, and e..xist over
sovereign states, it is arguable that the states have a qualified ownership.
Since other states of the Union are affected by another's use of
the douds and since our national defense and our interstate com4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

339 u. s. 699 (1950).
United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950).
339 u. s. 699, 704 (1950).
UNIFORM AttoNAUTics Acr, § 3, 11 U. L. A. 160 (1938).
11 U. L. A. (1949 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 11).
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merce and our navigable streams are vitally connected with the
atmosphere it is arguable that the United States also has rights. Mr.
Gus 0. Hatfield in discussing legal problems raised by artificial rainmaking concludes a note in the Vanderbilt Law Review as follows :9
"On the other hand, property interests and individual rights
must be protected against unwarranted invasions by the negli.,.
gent or capricious rain-maker. The only feasible solution appears to be some form of governmental regulation. It is doubtful
that completely successful controls could be imposed at the state
level, since interstate problems are certain to arise whenever
weather control is attempted on any substantial scale. All of
the problems which exist, especially the property aspect will be
duplicated at both interstate and international levels. The effects
of an artificially induced rainstorm cannot be confined to political
boundaries. It therefore appears likely that in the near future
it will be necessary to regulate rainmaking, not only by rules of
nation-wide application, but also by international treaty."
STATE OWNERSHIP OF wATERS: INTRODUCTION

There are various classifications of waters resulting from precipitation, but for the purposes of this paper I will use the following:
(1) 'Vaters flowing either on the surface or under the surface in a
·reasonably ascertainable well defined channel; (2) Surface waters
not flowing in a reasonably well defined channel and not collected
in natural ponds and lakes; (3) Underground waters not flowing
in a well defined channel commonly called percolating waters and artesian waters.
Waters flowing on the surface in a. reasonably well defined channel
are either navigable or non-navigable though some writers have still
a third kind, namely floatable but not navigable.
What are the rights of the states in each of these?
RIGHTS oF STATES IN SuRFACE WATERS FLowiNG IN \VELL
DEFINED CHANNELS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The waters of navigable streams and the beds of such streams are
the property of the states subject however to certain rights of the
federal government and of riparian owners. The prevailing test of
navigability in the United States is one of fact. A stream is navigable when it is used, or is susceptible of being used, in its ordinary
9. 4 VANDERBIL'l' LAw REV.
\VA'l'ER CoNTROL, 58 YALE L.

332, 337; See also BALL, SHAPING THE LAW oF

J.
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condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water. 10
It is equally well settled that the states do not own the waters or
beds of non-navigable streams. Thus in a Virginia case, Garden
Club of Virginia v. Virginia Public Service Con~pany,ll it was held
that a statute giving certain jurisdiction of the «waters of fhe state"
to the State Corporation Commission had no application to the waters
of a non-navigable stream, and hence in that case permission of the
State Corporation Commission was not a prerequisite for the construction of a dam sixty-three feet high and four hundred fifty feet
long near Goshen Pass in that State.
SAME: RIGHTS oF THE: UNITtn STATts- GtNtRAI,

The Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission
lists seven major limitations of the states on their powers of control
of and use of their waters. 12 It is certain that some of these will be
hotly denied by many, but at least they are worthy of our consideration.
SAME:: CoMMtRCE PowER

The most important of these limitations is that of the commerce
power. Where a river is used for the transportation of goods in
interstate commerce even though the river is an intrastate one (such
as the James River) it is a public highway. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall as early as 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden,IS said:
"The power of Congress . . . comprehends navigation within the limits of every state in the Union, so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian
tribes'."
And in Gilman v. Philadelphia,

14

the Supreme Court said:

"Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the
extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States
which are accessible from a State other than those in which
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1 (1935).
153 Va. 659, 151 S. E. 161 (1930).
Vol. 3, WATER REsouRCEs LAw, pp. 5 to 72.
9 WHEAT. 1, 197 (U. S. 1824).
3 WA!.L. 713, 724 (U. S. 1865).
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they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the
nation, and subject to all requisite legislation by Congress."
But generally, except for tidal waters there would be no navigable
streams but for the convergence of innumerable non-navigable ones.
As control of the non-navigable streams that affect the navigability
o£ navigable streams is or may be necessary for the control of the
latter Congress has jurisdiction over the former to the extent needed
for the protection of the latter.l5
Ramifications of this right of the United States over the navigable
waters of the country include flood control projects and the development and disposition of electric power for the exercise of the commerce authority by Congress is not invalidated because it elects to
serve purposes in addition to navigation, even if such other purposes
would not alone justify an exercise of Congressional power.l6
Moreover the Federal Power Act17 provides for the issuance of
licenses to nonfederal agencies for the development of water power
on streams under its jurisdiction. Any private company operating
'a power development prior to the passage of that Act took subject to
the powers of Congress and may be lawfully required under that
Act to accept a license with all its obligations and conditions.lB
SAMr:: Fr:nr:RAI. PROPRIJ;;'l'ARY Powr:R

Another possible limitation on the rights of the state
prietary power of the federal government. This power
number of phases. Article IV, Section 3, Clause II of
States Constitution which deals with the admission of
reads in part :

is the proexists in a
the United
new states

"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States ..."
And in United States v. San Francisco, 19 the United States Supreme Court stated :
"The power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress
is without limitations. "
15. See United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690 (1899)
and Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U. S. 508 (1941).
16. See Arizona v. California, 283, U. S. 423, 456 (1931).
17. 41 STAT. 1063, 49 STAT. 838, as amended, 16 U. S. C. 791a-825r.
18. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 123 F.
2d 155 (C. A. D. C. 1941), cert. denied 315 U. S. 806 (1942).
19. 310
16, 29 (1939).

u. s.
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In Light v. United States, 2 0 the same court said:
"And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be
administered. That is for Congress to determine. "
And in Canfield

'l!.

United States,2 1 the Supreme Court states:

"While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the
unlimited power to legislate against nuisances within a State,
which it would have within a Territory, we do not think the
admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of
legislating for the protection of the public lands though it may
thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the
police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its
own protection. A different rule would place the public domain
of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation."
The United States has acquired in one way or another vast tracts
of lands. In the ownership of these lands it is not an ordinary owner,
or even an ordinary riparian owner, for a state may not by legislation without the consent of Congress "destroy the right of the United
States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued
flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property".22
When the United States acquires land from a state by purchase
with consent of the state the latter can with the consent of the United
States reserve certain specified rights of sovereignty,23 but when the
land is acquired without or despite the consent of the state the United
States is not subject to any jurisdictional control by the state which
would impair or destroy the effective use for the purpose for which
the land was acquired.24
SAME: WAR PowER

Under the war power25 and the 1916 National Defense Act,26
Congress authorized the President to cause an investigation to be
made to determine the best means for the production of nitrates and
other products for munitions of war. Out of this legislation there
220 u. s. 523, 537 (1911).
167 u. s. 518, 525 (1897).
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907).
See Collins v. Yosemite Part & Curry Co., (taxing jurisdiction) 304
u. s. 518, 530 (1938).
24. Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 539 (1885).
25. U. S. CoNS'l'. Art. I, § 8, cis. 1, 11; Art. I, § 9, d. 7.
26. 39 STAT. 166, 50 U. S. C. A. 79.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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eventually came the Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee
River and finally the whole Tennessee Valley Authority Act.
But this is fast becoming the atomic age, and Congress knows
that fact. By statutes passed August 1, 194627 there are: (1) A
declaration of policy to the effect that there be established "a program for Government control of the production, ownership, and use
of fissionable material to assure the common defense and security
and to insure the broadest possible exploitation of the field ;"28 (2)
With two unimportant exceptions the Atomic Energy Commission,
as agent of the United States, shall be the exclusive owner of all
facilities for the production of fissionable material; 29 (3) "All right,
title, and interest within or under the jurisdiction of the United
States, in or to any fissionable material, now or hereafter produced,
shall be the property of the Commission ;"30 and, "no person shall
have any title in or to any fissionable material ;"31 ( 4) "As used in
this chapter the term 'source material' means uranium, thorium or
any other material which is determined by the Commission with the
approval of the President, to be peculiarly essential to the production of fissionable materials ;"32 ( 5) "The Commission is authorized
and directed to purchase, take, requisition, condemn, or otherwise
acquire, supplies of source materials or any interest in real property
containing deposits of source materials to the extent it deems necessary to effectuate the provisions of this chapter."33
I might put in parenthetically that it would not be too surprising
if within the foreseeable future atomic power will be available for
the large scale purification of ocean water and for the pumping of
it and other waters wherever we desire for all our manifold uses.
But be that as it may, I believe that it is safe to predict that the
states as such will have little or no control over atomic energy and
the natural resources required for its utilization.
SAME: GENERAL WtLFARE CLAUSE

Further Congress is expressly empowered to levy taxes for the
general welfare :
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes .
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

60 STAT. 755, 42 U. S. C. A. 1801 et seq.
!d. § 1801 (4).
ld. § 1804 (c) (1).
Id. § 1805 (a) (2).
Ibid.
Id. § 1805 (b) (1).
Id. § 1805 (b) (5).
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and provide for the common defense and general welfare of
the United States."34
While the proper construction of this clause is controversial to
say the least the Supreme Court of the United States has gone so far
as to assert :35
"Thus the power of Congress to promote the general welfare
through large scale projects for reclamation, irrigation and other
internal improvements, is now as clear and ample as its power
to accomplish the same results indirectly through resort to
strained interpretation of the power of navigation."
The only certain limitation appears to be that such power should
be exercised for the common benefit as distinguished from some
mere local purpose.36 Query: ·what is a mere local purpose? We
have grown to be so interdependent that what is done in one locality
frequently affects in one way or another what is done in many other
places.
SAME: DoCTRINE ol" EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT

The rights of the states over their water courses may be further
limited in some cases by the doctrine of equitable apportionment.
This doctrine has been chiefly applied in the western States to interstate streams to insure to the inhabitants of each state involved a
fair share of the benefits from the use of such waters. This result
should be attained in so far as possible without quibbling over formulas.37
SAME: INTERSTATE COMPACTS

Congress in 1911 authorized in advance the entering into by the
states of interstate compacts "for the purpose of conserving the
forests and the water supply of the States."38 To date these compacts have been used chiefly to apportion the waters of interstate
streams, and to control pollution and floods. The action taken thereunder is binding upon the citizens of each state and all water claimants, even where the State had granted the water rights before it
had entered into the compact.39
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

U. S. CoNST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725, 738 (1950).
Ibid.
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907).
36 STAT. 961, 16 U. S. C. 552.
Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U. S. 92, 106 (1938).
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SAME: RrGH'rS oF RIPARIAN OwNERS

The right of the state to its navigable waters is also subject to certain rights of riparian owners which the state can take away by eminent domain proceedings unless, of course, the United States is the
riparian owner. Each such owner has a right of access to the channel, and the right to make a reasonable use of the water as it flows
by and in connection with riparian land so long as he does not unreasonably pollute or divert it. The sommon law maxim is "Waters
should flow as they have been accustomed to flow". When there is
a great surplus of water for everyone no harm is done by such a rule,
but when there is an acute shortage of water what rule could be more
ridiculous? In effect such a rule would mean, "Since there is not
enough water for all no one can use in substantial quantities what
there is -and cursed be the non-riparian owners !"
SAME: SuMMARY

Thus while the states own their navigable waters this ownership
is subject to the commerce power, the war power, the proprietary
property rights, the treaty making power, the general welfare power
of the federal government, the doctrine of equitable apportionment
where the stream is an interstate one, to any interstate compacts that
have been made as well as the rights of riparian owners.
THE Jus PuBLICUM AND THE Jus PRIVA'rt::i:II

It is also said that the ownership of the states' navigable waters
has a double aspect- the jus publicum or public right and the jus
privatum or private right. To the extent that a state owns its navigable waters and the beds of streams in its private right it may alien
the same as any owner, as for example a lease of a part of the bed of
a drowned river bottom for the propagation of oysters. But to the
extent that a state owns in its public right it owns in trust for all its
citizens and can grant no monopoly. These principles were brought
out strongly in the case of Commonwealth v. Newport News, 40 in
which it was held that the legislature of the Commonwealth of Virginia had the power to authorize the City of Newport News to discharge its untreated sewage into the waters of Hampton Roads as
long as no public nuisance resulted and navigation was not interfered with despite the fact that such pollution might contaminate
nearby oyster beds and interfere with established recreational uses
40. 158 Va. 521, 164 S. E. 689 (1932).
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of the tidal waters. The Commonwealth as owner in its private
right could decide what use of that right best served the public interest, and any lessee of river bottoms for oyster culture took subject
to such possibilities.
PERcoLATING vVATERs: RIGHTs oF THE STATEs

The State is vitally interested in the maintenance of the water
table, for on it depends the capacity of wells and springs and to a
great extent the production of all agricultural products. The water
table in turn for the most part is dependent on percolating waters
for its maintenance, i. e. that portion of the total rainfall that sinks
into the ground rather than runs off or evaporates. These waters
are in the very nature of things well nigh impossible of ownership
until actually reduced to possession so that while they are in one
sense the property of the state in much the same way as are wild
animals this ownership (if it may be called such) is quite restricted.
But it is sufficient to permit regulation as to such matters as waste,
interference for spite only, and pollution.
Another type of percolating water is known as artesian water.
It has its origin for the most part in the mountains where as a result of tilted strata the waters get under bed rock and gradually
work their way to the seas or other outlets. These waters are frequently under pressure and in such a situation when the lower strata
are tapped these waters flow naturally to the surface. The principal
problem here is to prevent waste for experience has shown that an
uncapped flowing well in one locality may affect the supply of quite
distant localities.
OwNERSHIP oF BEDS oF STREAMS

In the case of non-navigable waters the ownership of the beds of
the streams is in the adjoining landowners and not in the state. But
in the case of navigable streams the ownership of the beds is in the
state. \iVhether this state ownership e..'Ctends to the ordinary low
water mark or to ordinary high water mark is a question in much
dispute. It has been held in Florida4 1 and in South Carolina42 that
the State owns to the high water mark. But according to some writers43 the better view, albeit a minority one, is that public ownership
extends only to low water mark, and such is the law by statute in
Virginia.44
41.
42.
43.
44.

Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. R Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917).
State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. SO ( 1884).
See MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY (2d ed.) pp. 85-86 (1928).
VA. ConE ANN. § 62-2 (1950).
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OwNERSHIP oF SuRFACE \VATERS

Waters gathered together on the surface of the land and not running in any well defined channel and not a part of a natural lake or
pond are commonly called surface waters. Generally everyone disclaims ownership of them. According to one theory (mistakenly called
the common law theory) 45 they are a common enemy from which
let him save himself who can, subject of <:ourse to the general rule
that in saving oneself one should do no more damage than necessary
to others. According to another theory known as the civil law rule
lower land is by nature servient to higher land in the matter of drainage. The role of the State in the case of surface water is primarily
that of arbiter. Nevertheless there is at least in some localities a
strong public policy in favor of control and conservation of temporarily excessive surface water in ponds, cisterns, and reservoirs.
STATE oR FEDERAI. CoNTRor. AND DEVEI.OPMENT?

In the development, use, and conservation of these natural resources owned by the states the question is bound to arise, and has
arisen over and over, as to whether cities, counties, states, or the
federal government should play the dominant part. It is easy to say
that local matters should be handled by the local governments, and
general matters should be handled by the state or federal government
either directly or through private enterprise. But this problem has
too many ramifications for a paper of this sort. It is obviously in the
interests of the nation as well as the states that we all use our water
resources to their fullest potentialities. The main thing is that this
be done wisely, efficiently and honestly. By whom it is to be done
is, after all, of secondary importance.46

45. See John B. Rood, Surface Waters in Cities, 6 MICH. L. Rmr. 449, 452.
46. For bibliographies on this subject prepared with special reference to the
Central Valley of California but equally applicable to other projects see 38
CAI.IF. L. Rltv. pp. 761-781.

